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Abstract
We characterize the core many-to-one matchings as fixed points of a map.
Our characterization gives an algorithm for finding core allocations; the al-
gorithm is efficient and simple to implement. Our characterization does not
require substitutable preferences, so it is separate from the structure needed
for the non-emptiness of the core. When preferences are substitutable, our
characterization gives a simple proof of the lattice structure of core matchings,
and it gives a method for computing the join and meet of two core matchings.
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1 Introduction
This paper deals with the many-to-one matchings that are in the core. Given a set
of workers and a set of firms, a many-to-one matching (a matching, for short) is an
assignment of a group of workers to each firm. The problem is interesting because
each worker has a preference relation over firms, and each firm has a preference
relation over groups of workers. Given a matching, firms who are unhappy with their
current group of workers, and workers who are unhappy with their current employers,
may recontract in a mutually beneficial way, thus destroying the proposed matching.
Arguably, the natural formalization of matchings that are robust to recontracting is
the core (see Roth and Sotomayor [12], RS in the rest of the paper, for definitions).
The standard approach to the core (RS is a classic) is to impose some structure on
firms’ preferences that both simplifies the core and ensures that it is non-empty; the
structure used is to assume that firms’ preferences are “substitutable” (see RS, or our
Definition 5 below). When preferences are substitutable, a matching is in the core
if and only if it is “stable”—a stable matching is robust to recontracting by worker-
firm pairs, but not more complicated coalitions. Further, there is an algorithm,
the “deferred acceptance algorithm” (DAA) which finds certain distinguished core
matchings: the DAA finds a core matching that is better for the firms than all other
core matchings, and a core matching that is better for the workers than all other core
matchings. Kelso and Crawford [7] introduced the notion of substitutability (their
“gross substitutes” condition) and first used it to prove—via the DAA—that the core
is non-empty in a class of models that, under substitutability, includes the model
studied in our paper.
Our approach is different. We characterize the core as the set of fixed points of a
map T . We do not add structure to the model, so the core (and the fixed points of
T ) may be empty. Our characterization is useful because it allows us to:
1. Construct a simple algorithm that consists in iterating T , we shall call it the
T -algorithm. The T -algorithm either finds a core matching or cycles in a rec-
ognizable way. Unlike the DAA, the T -algorithm does not stop at a non-core
matching. We present an example where the DAA stops at a non-core matching,
while the T -algorithm succeeds in finding a core matching.
2. We prove that, when preferences are substitutable, T has at least one fixed
point—hence that the core is non-empty—and that the T -algorithm finds the
two distinguished core matchings: the matching that is best for the firms and
the matching that is best for the workers.
We can bound the computational complexity of the T -algorithm. To the best of
our knowledge, the computational complexity of the DAA for the many-to-one
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case is unknown. 1
3. Blair [3] proves that, when preferences are substitutable, the core matchings
have a lattice structure.
(a) Our characterization gives a very simple proof of Blair’s result; it follows
almost immediately from Tarski’s fixed point theorem, as T is a monotone
map under an appropriate order.
(b) There is no formula for computing Blair’s lattice operations (join and
meet). We show how the T -algorithm computes the join and meet of
any two core matchings.
Our results on the core build a bridge to the literature on supermodular games
(see [15]); in fact, our results on the T -algorithm are adapted from similar results
on computing Nash equilibria in supermodular games. We believe that this bridge is
useful for understanding matching problems better, and may deliver further results
in future research.
Fixed-point methods have been used in the matching literature before. Tarski’s
fixed-point theorem was applied by Roth and Sotomayor [11] to the assignment game,
Adachi [1] to one-to-one stable matchings, and Fleiner [5] to many-to-one stable
matchings. Fleiner’s is the paper closest to our paper; he proves a version of Blair’s
lattice result for a general graph-theoretic model. Fleiner’s model includes the many-
to-one matching model with substitutable preferences as a special case. Fleiner’s
paper is a paper in graph theory, though, and his results are very hard to translate
into the language of matching models. For that reason, we believe that our result in
(3.a) above is valuable, beyond its auxiliary role in our other results.
We should clarify at this point that “core” is RS’s “weak core.” We do not have
results for RS’s “strong core,” hence we opted, in the interest of exposition economy,
for omitting all “weak” qualifiers from the paper. Nothing is really known about the
strong core, so we feel that our omission is justified. See RS, and Sotomayor [13], for
a discussion of the different core definitions.
In Section 2 we define the model, and prove some preliminary results on the core
many-to-one matchings. In Section 3 we introduce our fixed-point approach to the
core. In Section 4 we introduce the T -algorithm. In Section 5 we study the lattice
structure of the core many-to-one matchings. In Section 6 we analyze the T -algorithm
for substitutable preferences.
1Gusfield and Irving [6] prove that the DAA is O(n2) for one-to-one matchings.
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2 Preliminary definitions and results
2.1 The Model
There are two disjoint sets of agents, the set of n firms F and the set of m workers
W . Each firm f ∈ F has a strict, transitive, and complete preference relation P (f)
over the set of all subsets ofW , and each worker has a strict, transitive, and complete
preference relation P (w) over F ∪ ∅. Preferences profiles are (n+m)–tuples of
preference relations; we denote them by P = (P (f1) , ..., P (fn) ;P (w1) , ..., P (wm)).
Given a firm’s preference relation, P (f), the sets of workers that f prefers to
the empty set are called acceptable; thus we allow that firm f may prefer not hiring
any worker rather than hiring unacceptable subsets of workers. Similarly, given a
preference relation of a worker P (w) the firms preferred by w to the empty set are
called acceptable; in this case we are allowing that worker w may prefer to remain
unemployed rather than working for an unacceptable firm. It turns out that only
acceptable partners matter, so we shall write preference relation concisely as lists of
acceptable partners. For example, P (fi) = {w1, w3} , {w2} , {w1} , {w3} indicates that
{w1, w3}P (fi) {w2}P (fi) {w1}P (fi) {w3}P (fi) ∅. And P (wj) = f1, f3 indicates
that f1P (wj) f3P (wj) ∅.
We denote by R the weak orders associated with P . So, fiR (w) fj if fi = fj or
fiP (w) fj. Similarly for R (f).
We shall study assignments of workers to firms as matchings of firms with groups of
workers. The assignment problem consists of matching workers with firms maintaining
the bilateral nature of their relationship, and allowing for the possibility that both
firms and workers may remain unmatched. Formally,
Definition 1 A matching µ is a mapping from the set F ∪W into the set of all
subsets of F ∪W such that for all w ∈ W and F ∈ F : a) Either |µ (w) | = 1 and
µ (w) ⊆ F or else µ (w) = ∅. b) µ (f) ∈ 2W . c) µ (w) = {f} 2 if and only if
w ∈ µ (f) .
Given (F,W, P ) we denote the set of matchings by M.
Let P be a preference profile. Given a set S ⊆ W , let Ch (S, P (f)) denote firm
F ’s most-preferred subset of S according to its preference ordering P (f). We call
Ch (S, P (f)) the choice set of S according to P (f). That is, A = Ch (S, P (f)) if
and only if A ⊆ S and AP (f)B for all B ⊆ S with A 6= B.
2We shall often abuse notation by omitting the brackets to denote a set with a unique element;
here we write µ (w) = f instead of µ (w) = {f}.
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2.2 The core, stable matchings, and stable* matchings
A matching µ is stable if no worker-firm pair can benefit by deviating from µ. RS
prove that, if firms’ preferences are substitutable, the set of stable matchings equals
the core.
A matching is stable* if no set of workers can, jointly with one firm, benefit from
deviating from µ. We prove that the set of stable* matchings equals the core; the
result does not require additional assumptions on preferences. We use the notion of
stable* matching instead of stable matching because our fixed-point approach allows
us to characterize the set of stable* matchings, and thus the core. It should be clear
from our proofs and examples just how useful the stable* definition is.
Let P be a preference profile and let µ be a matching. Say that µ is individually
rational if µ(w)R (w) ∅ for all w ∈ W , and if µ(f) = Ch (µ (f) , P (f)) , for all
f ∈ F . Intuitively, µ is individually rational if no agent can unilaterally improve over
its assignment by µ—workers by choosing to remain unemployed and firms by firing
some of its workers.
A worker-firm pair (w, f) blocks µ if w /∈ µ (f), w ∈ Ch (µ (f) ∪ {w} , P (f)), and
fP (w)µ (w); that is, if w and f are not matched through µ, firm f wants to hire
w—possibly after firing some of its current workers in µ(f)— and worker w prefers
firm f over her current match µ (w).
Let P be a preference profile and let µ be a matching. A pair (B, f) ∈ 2W × F ,
with B 6= ∅, blocks* µ if fP (w)µ(w), for all w ∈ B, and there is A ⊆ µ (f) such that
[A ∪B]P (f)µ (f). In words, (B, f) blocks* µ if firm f is willing to hire the workers
in B—possibly after firing some of its current workers in µ(f)—and all workers w in
B prefer f over their current match µ(w).
Definition 2 A matching µ is stable if is individually rational and there is no
worker-firm pair that blocks µ. A matching µ is stable* if it is individually rational
and there is no pair that blocks* µ.
Notation. Given a preference profile P , we denote the set of stable matchings by
S(P ), and the set of stable* matchings by S∗(P ).
Lemma 1 S∗(P ) ⊆ S(P )
Proof. Let µ ∈ S∗(P ), and assume that µ /∈ S(P ). Since µ is individually ra-
tional, and µ /∈ S(P ), there exist (w, f) ∈ W × F such that fP (w)µ(w) and
w ∈ Ch (µ (f) ∪ {w}, P (f)). This implies Ch (µ (f) ∪ {w}, P (f))P (f)µ (f) . Let
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B = {w}, and A = Ch (µ (f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) ∩ µ (f). Then (B, f) blocks* µ. Thus,
µ /∈ S∗ (P ) .
We prove below that S∗(P ) equals the core, so it follows from standard results
that S∗(P ) and S(P ) may be different. We present an example as “supplementary
material” in http://www.nyu.edu/jet/supplementary.html and in the working-
paper version ([4]) of the paper.
Definition 3 Let P be a preference profile. The core is the set of matchings µ for
which there is no F ′ ⊆ F , W ′ ⊆ W with F ′ ∪W ′ 6= ∅, and µˆ ∈ M that satisfy a),
b) and c): a) For all w ∈ W ′ and f ∈ F ′ µˆ(w) ⊆ F ′, and µˆ(f) ⊆ W ′. b) For all
w ∈ W ′ and f ∈ F ′, µˆ(w)R(w)µ(w) and µˆ(f)R(f)µ(f). c) There is s ∈ W ′∪F ′ with
µˆ(s)P (s)µ(s). We shall denote the core by Cw(P ).
Theorem 2 S∗ (P ) = Cw(P ).
Proof. First we shall prove that S∗(P ) ⊆ Cw(P ). Let µ ∈ S∗ (P ), and suppose
that µ /∈ Cw(P ). Let F ′ ⊆ F , W ′ ⊆ W with F ′ ∪ W ′ 6= ∅, and let µˆ ∈ M such
that, for all w ∈ W ′, and for all f ∈ F ′, µˆ(w) ⊆ F ′, and µˆ(f) ⊆ W ′, µˆ(w)R(w)µ(w),
µˆ(f)R(f)µ(f), and µˆ(s)P (s)µ(s) for at least one s ∈ W ′ ∪ F ′. We shall need the
following
Claim. There exists f ∈ F ′, such that µˆ(f)P (f)µ(f) if and only if there is w ∈ W ′
such that µˆ(w)P (w)µ(w).
Proof of the claim. Let µˆ(f)P (f)µ(f). Because µ is individually rational, we
have that µˆ(f) * µ(f), so let w ∈ µˆ(f)\µ(f). By definition of µˆ we have that
w ∈ µˆ(f) ⊆ W ′; so w /∈ µ(f) and the definition of µˆ implies that µˆ(w)P (w)µ(w).
Now suppose there exists w ∈ W ′ such that µˆ(w)P (w)µ(w). Let f = µˆ(w). Then
f 6= µ (w), so w /∈ µ (f) . Thus µˆ(f) 6= µ(f), and the definition of µˆ implies that
µˆ(f)P (f)µ(f). This proves the claim.
By the claim, we can assume that there exists f ∈ F ′ such that µˆ(f) 6= µ(f).
Let B = µˆ(f)\µ(f) and A = µˆ(f) ∩ µ(f) then A ∪ B = µˆ(f)P (f)µ(f). Now,
B ⊆ µˆ(f) ⊆ W ′, and B ∩ µ(f) = ∅. Then (B, f) blocks* µ , this contradicts that
µ ∈ S∗ (P ) .
Now we shall prove that Cw(P ) ⊆ S∗(P ). Let µ ∈ Cw (P ), and suppose that
µ /∈ S∗(P ). First we shall show that µ is individually rational. Assume that there
exists f ∈ F such that µ (f) 6= Ch (µ (f) , P (f)) . Let µ̂ (f) = Ch (µ (f) , P (f)) ,
F ′ = {f} ⊆ F, W ′ = µ̂ (f) ⊆ W. Thus W ′, F ′, and µˆ imply µ /∈ Cw (P ). Thus,
µ (f) = Ch (µ (f) , P (f)) , for all f ∈ F .
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Now suppose there is w ∈ W such that ∅P (w)µ (w) . Let µ̂ (w) = ∅, W ′ = {w},
F ′ = ∅. As before, µ /∈ Cw (P ) because µˆ(w)P (w)µ(w). Thus, µ (w)R (w) ∅, for all
w ∈ W . Thus µ is individual rational.
Assume that there exist (B, f) ∈ 2W × F with B 6= ∅, such that: for all w ∈ B,
fP (w)µ(w), and there exists A ⊆ µ (f) such that [A ∪B]P (f)µ (f). Letting µˆ(f) =
A ∪B, F ′ = {f} and W ′ = B, it follows that µ /∈ Cw (P ). A contradiction.
2.3 Lattices and chains
Let X be a set, and R a partial order—a transitive, reflexive, antisymmetric binary
relation—on X. For any subset A of X, infRA (supRA) is the greatest (lowest) lower
(upper) bound on A, in the order R. We say that the pair (X,R) is a lattice if
whenever x, y ∈ X, both x∧R y = infR{x, y} and x∨R y = supR{x, y} exist in X. We
say that a lattice (X,R) is complete if for every nonempty subset A of X, infRA
and supRA exist in X. Note that any finite lattice is complete. A lattice (X,R) is a
chain if, for any x, y ∈ X, xRy or yRx, or both, are true.
3 The core as a set of fixed points
We shall construct a map T on a superset of M such that the set of fixed points of
T is the core.
3.1 Pre-matchings
Say that a pair ν = (νF , νW ), with νF : F → 2W and νW : W → F ∪ {∅}, is a pre-
matching . Let VW (VF ) denote the set of all νW (νF ) functions. Thus, V = VF×VW
denotes the set of pre–matchings ν = (νF , νW ). The superset of M we need turns
out to be the set of pre-matchings V (pre-matchings were first used in [1]).
A pre-matching ν = (νF , νW ), and a matching µ are equivalent if µ(f) = νF (f)
for all f , and µ(w) = νW (w) for all w. A pre-matching ν = (νF , νW ) is equivalent to
some matching if and only if ν is such that νW (w) = f if and only if w ∈ νF (f) .
Notation. We make two conventions. First, we shall identify matchings and pre-
matchings when they are equivalent, so if ν ∈ V is equivalent to some matching µ we
shall say that ν is a matching. Hence M is a subset of V . Second, if ν = (νF , νW ) is
a pre-matching, we shall some times write ν(f) for νF (f) and ν(w) for νW (w).
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3.2 T and the core
Let ν be a pre-matching, and let U (f, ν) = {w ∈ W : fR (w) ν (w)} , and V (w, ν) =
{f ∈ F : w ∈ Ch (ν (f) ∪ {w}) , P (f)} ∪ {∅}. The set U(f, ν) is the set of workers w
that are willing to give up ν(w) in exchange for f . The set V (w, µ) is the set of firms
f that are willing to hire w, possibly after firing some of the workers it was assigned
by ν.
Now, define T : V → V by (Tν) (s) = Ch (U (s, ν) , P (s)) if s ∈ F , and (Tν) (s) =
max
P (s)
{V (s, ν)} if s ∈ W . The map T has a simple interpretation: (Tν)(f) is firm f ’s
optimal team of workers, among those willing to work for f , and (Tν)(w) is the firm
preferred by w among the firms that are willing to hire w. We shall denote by E the
set of fixed points of T , so E = {ν ∈ V : ν = Tν}.
Theorem 3 E = S∗ (P ).
Before we prove Theorem 3, note that Theorems 2 and 3 imply:
Corollary 4 E = Cw (P ).
Proof of Theorem 3. First we shall prove that if ν ∈ E , then ν is a matching and
ν is individually rational. Let ν = (νF , νW ) ∈ E . Fix w ∈ νF (f), we shall prove that
f = νW (w). ν ∈ E implies that w ∈ νF (f) = (Tν) (f) = Ch (U (f, ν) , P (f)). Thus
w ∈ U(f, ν).
The definition of U(f, ν) implies fR (w) νW (w). Now, νF (f) ∪ {w} = νF (f) and
ν ∈ E imply that νF (f) = (Tν) (f) = Ch(U(f, ν), P (f)) (F). So
Ch (νF (f) , P (f))
(1)
= Ch (Ch (U (f, ν) , P (f)) , P (f))
(2)
= Ch (U (f, ν) , P (f))
(3)
= νF (f) .
Equalities (1) and (3) follow from (F). Equality (2) is a simple property of choice
sets. Hence νF (f) = Ch(νF (f) , P (f)).
Now, w ∈ νF (f) implies Ch(νF (f) , P (f)) = Ch(νF (f) ∪ {w}, P (f)). So we
have f ∈ V (w, ν). But νW (w) = (Tν)(w) = maxP (w) {V (w, ν)}, so νW (w)R (w) f .
But fR (w) νW (w), so f = νW (w), as R(w) is antisymmetric.
Let f = νW (w), we shall prove that w ∈ νF (f). First, note that f = νW (w) im-
plies that w ∈ U(f, ν). Second, note that f = νW (w) = (Tν) (w) = maxP (w) {V (w, ν)},
because ν ∈ E . So νW (w)R (w) ∅, and since νF (f) = Ch(νF (f) , P (f)), ν is individ-
ually rational.
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Now, f ∈ V (w, ν), so we must have w ∈ Ch(νF (f)∪{w}, P (f)) by the definition
of V (w, ν). That is,
w ∈ Ch(νF (f) ∪ {w}, P (f))R (f) νF (f) , (1)
Now, ν ∈ E implies that
νF (f) = (Tν) (f) = Ch (U (f, ν) , P (f)) . (2)
The definition of choice set implies νF (f) ⊆ U (f, ν), and νF (f)R (f)U (f, ν). But
w ∈ U(f, ν) implies U (f, ν) ⊇ Ch(νF (f) ∪ {w}, P (f)).
The definition of choice set implies νF (f)R (f)Ch(νF (f)∪{w}, P (f)). Together
with (1), this implies w ∈ νF (f).
We have shown that w ∈ vF (f) if and only if f = vW (w). So, ν is a matching.
Also, ν is individually rational.
Let µ ∈ E . Fix f ∈ F, B ⊆ W such that B 6= ∅. We assume that, for all w ∈ B,
fP (w)µ (w) . By the definition of U (f, µ), we have that B ⊆ U (f, µ) . Let A ⊆ µ (f).
Because µ is a matching, we have that for all w ∈ A, f = µ (w) . So the definition of
U (f, µ) implies that
A ⊆ U (f, µ) . (3)
Now, µ ∈ E so µ (f) = (Tµ) (f) = Ch (U (f, µ) , P (f)); B ⊆ U (f, µ) and statement
(3) imply then
µ (f)R (f)Ch (A ∪B,P (f))R (f)A ∪B. (4)
So there is no (B, f) that blocks* µ. Thus µ ∈ S∗ (P ) .
Let µ ∈ S∗ (P ) and assume that µ 6= Tµ. First assume that there exist f ∈ F
such that
µ (f) 6= (Tµ) (f) = Ch (U (f, µ) , P (f)) = C ⊆ U (f, µ) .
Let A = C ∩µ (f) , and B = C\µ (f) . Because µ is an individually rational matching
we have that µ (f) ⊆ U (f, µ) and B 6= ∅. Then (B, f) blocks* µ, which contradicts
that µ ∈ S∗(P ).
Hence, for all f ∈ F ,
µ (f) = (Tµ) (f) . (5)
Assume that there exists w ∈ W such that
µ (w) 6= (Tµ) (w) = max
P (w)
{V (w, µ)} = f ∈ V (w, µ) ,
so w ∈ Ch (µ (f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) , by the definition on V (w, µ).
But µ is a matching, so we have that w /∈ µ(f) and µ (w) ∈ V (w, µ) . This implies
that fP (w)µ (w), and w ∈ Ch (µ (f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) = C. Let A = C ∩ µ (f) = C −
{w}, and B = {w}. Then (B, f) blocks* µ. Hence, for all w ∈ W , µ (w) = (Tµ) (w).
This and statement (5) imply µ = Tµ. Hence µ ∈ E .
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4 The T -algorithm
The T -algorithm is very simple: start at some ν ∈ V and iterate Tν until two itera-
tions are identical. When two iterations are identical, stop.
We prove that, when the T -algorithm stops, it must be at a core matching.
Further, we show that once the T -algorithm hits on a matching µ (not just a pre-
matching), µ must be in the core. Hence, the T -algorithm “wanders” around pre-
matchings until it finds a matching—it will stop at the matching it finds, and it will
be a core matching. It follows, of course, that if the core is empty the algorithm must
cycle, and that the cycle will only involve pre-matchings that are not matchings.
The algorithm is very simple, but we include a detailed description to be as clear
as possible, and to introduce some notation that we shall use in the proofs below:
Algorithm 1 (T -algorithm)
1. Set ν0 = ν. Set ν1 = Tν0 and k = 1.
2. While νk 6= νk−1, do:
(a) Set k = k + 1,
(b) set νk = Tνk−1.
3. Set µ = νk. Stop.
Proposition 5 If the T -algorithm stops at µ ∈ V, then µ is a matching (µ ∈ M)
and µ is in the core. If νk is in the core, for some iteration k of the T -algorithm,
then the algorithm stops at µ = νk.
Proof. If the algorithm stops at µ then νk = νk−1 = µ. Then, µ = Tνk−1 = Tµ, so
µ ∈ E . By Corollary 4, µ ∈ Cw(P ). On the other hand, if νk is in the core, then νk
is a fixed point of T by Corollary 4. Then the T -algorithm stops at µ = νk.
Proposition 6 If νk is a matching, for some iteration k in the T -algorithm, then
the algorithm stops at µ = νk, and thus νk is a core matching.
We shall present the proof of Proposition 6 as two lemmata:
Lemma 7 Let ν ∈ V be a pre–matching. If ν1 = Tν is a matching, then ν1 is
individually rational.
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Proof. For all f ∈ F ,
ν1 (f) = (Tν) (f) = Ch (U (f, ν) , P (f)) .
So
Ch (ν1 (f) , P (f))
(1)
= Ch (Ch (U (f, ν) , P (f)) , P (f))
(2)
= Ch (U (f, ν) , P (f))
(3)
= ν1 (f) .
Equalities (1) and (3) follow because ν1 = Tν. Equality (2) is a property of choice
sets. So, for all f ∈ F ,
ν1 (f) = Ch
(
ν1 (f) , P (f)
)
. (6)
For all w ∈ W ,
ν1 (w) = (Tν) (w) = max
P (w)
{V (w, ν)} ∪ {∅} .
So,
ν1 (w)R (w) ∅. (7)
Statements (6) and (7) show that ν1 is individually rational.
Lemma 8 If Tν is a matching, for some ν ∈ V, then Tν is a core matching. Thus
if νk = Tνk−1 is a matching, then the T -algorithm must stop at νk, and νk is a core
matching.
Proof. We shall prove that, if ν ∈ V is a pre–matching, and ν1 = Tν is a matching,
then ν1 ∈ S∗ (P ) . The lemma follows from Proposition 5, as S∗(P ) = E = Cw(P ).
Assume that ν1 /∈ S∗ (P ) . By Lemma 7, ν1 is individually rational, so there must
exist a (B, f) that blocks ν1. Hence, for all w ∈ B (B 6= ∅),
fP (w) ν1 (w) , (8)
and there must exist A ⊆ ν1 (f) such that
[A ∪B]P (f) ν1 (f) . (9)
But ν1 is a matching, and ν1 = Tν, so we have that for all w ∈ B, w ∈ ν1 (ν1 (w)). But
ν1 (ν1 (w)) = (Tν) (ν1 (w)) = Ch (U (ν1 (w) , ν) , P (ν1 (w))), so that, w ∈ U (ν1 (w) , ν),
i.e.
ν1 (w)R (w) ν (w) . (10)
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Statements (8) and (10) imply that, for all w ∈ B, fR (w) ν (w), i.e.
B ⊆ U (f, ν) . (11)
Now, A ⊆ ν1 (f) and ν1 (f) = (Tν) (f) = Ch (U (f, ν) , P (f)) , so
A ⊆ U (f, ν) . (12)
Statements (9), (11), and (12) contradict that ν1 (f) = (Tν) (f) = Ch (U (f, ν) , P (f)) .
Thus ν1 ∈ S∗ (P ) .
Remarks.
• Proposition 6, and Example 9 below, imply that the T -algorithm and the DAA
are different algorithms; we have not simply written down the DAA using dif-
ferent language.
• Unlike the DAA, the T -algorithm only stops at a core matchings. Example 9
below shows how the T -algorithm succeeds in finding a core matching, while
the DAA stops at a non-core matching.
• When the core is empty, the T -algorithm must cycle. We present an example as
“supplementary material” in http://www.nyu.edu/jet/supplementary.html
and in the working-paper version ([4]) of the paper.
Example 9 Let F = {f1, f2} , W = {w1, w2, w3, w4} , and the preference profile P
be defined by: P (f1) = {w1, w2}, {w3, w4}, {w1, w3}, {w2, w4}, {w1}, {w2}, {w3}, {w4},
P (f2) = {w1, w2}, {w1, w3}, {w2, w4}, {w3, w4}, {w1}, {w2}, {w3}, {w4}, P (w1) = f1, f2,
P (w2) = f2, f1, P (w3) = f1, f2, and P (w4) = f1, f2.
Note that P is not substitutable, as w1 ∈ Ch ({w1, w2, w3, w4}, P (f1)) = {w1, w2}
while w1 /∈ Ch ({w1, w3, w4}, P (f1)) = {w3, w3}. The T -algorithm starting at
f1 f2 w1 w2 w3 w4
ν0 = {w1, w2} {w1, w2} ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
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does:
f1 f2 w1 w2 w3 w4
U(f, ν0)/V (w, ν0) = {w1, w2, w3, w4} {w1, w2, w3, w4} f1, f2 f1, f2 ∅ ∅
ν1 = {w1, w2} {w1, w2} f1 f2 ∅ ∅
U(f, ν1)/V (w, ν1) = {w1, w3, w4} {w2, w3, w4} f1, f2 f1, f2 ∅ ∅
ν2 = {w3, w4} {w2, w4} f1 f2 ∅ ∅
U(f, ν2)/V (w, ν2) = {w1, w3, w4} {w2, w3, w4} f2 f2 f1 f1, f2
ν3 = {w3, w4} {w2, w4} f2 f2 f1 f1
U(f, ν3)/V (w, ν3) = {w1, w3, w4} {w1, w2} f2 f2 f1 f1, f2
ν4 = {w3, w4} {w1, w2} f2 f2 f1 f1
Note that νi for i = 0, 1, 2, 3 are not matchings; ν4 is a matching so, by Proposition 6,
ν4 is a core matching.
On the other hand, the DAA stops at a matching that is not in the core. For the
DAA, the equivalent to starting the T -algorithm at ν0 is, as we shall see in Section 5,
the DAA with firms proposing. The DAA with firms proposing stops at the matching
f1 f2 w1 w2 w3 w4
µ = {w3, w4} {w2} ∅ f2 f1 f1.
But µ is not in the core, as f2P (w1)µ(w1) = ∅, f2R(w2)µ(w2) = f2, and {w1, w2}P (f2){w2}
implies that ({w1, w2}, f2) blocks* µ.
5 The lattice structure of the core
We shall introduce a partial order on V such that, if preferences are substitutable,
T is a monotone increasing map. Tarski’s fixed point theorem then delivers a lattice
structure on E , and thus on Cw(P ).
Definition 4 Define the following partial orders on VF , VW and V:
1. P (F ) on VF by νFP (F ) ν ′F if and only if ν ′F 6= νF and, for all f in F , νF (f) =
ν ′F (f) or
νF (f) = Ch (νF (f) ∪ ν ′F (f) , P (f)) .
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2. P (W ) on VW by νWP (W ) ν ′W if and only if ν ′W 6= νW and
νW (w)R (w) ν
′
W (w) for all w ∈ W.
3. The weak partial orders associated to P (F ) and P (W ) are denoted R(F ) and
R(W ), defined as: νFR(F )ν
′
F if νF = ν
′
F or νFP (F )ν
′
F , and νWR(W )ν
′
W if
νW = ν
′
W or νWP (W )ν
′
W .
4. P (F ) on V by νP (F ) ν ′ iff νFP (F ) ν ′F and ν ′WR (W ) νW , or νFR (F ) ν ′F and
ν ′WP (W ) νW .
5. P (W ) on V by νP (W ) ν ′ iff νWP (W ) ν ′W and ν ′FR (F ) νF , or νWR (W ) ν ′W
and ν ′FP (F ) νF .
Definition 5 A firm f ’s preference ordering P (f) satisfies substitutability if for
any set S ⊆ W containing workers w and w¯ (w 6= w¯), if w ∈ Ch (S, P (f)) then
w ∈ Ch (S\ {w¯} , P (f)). A preference profile P is substitutable if, for each firm f ,
the preference ordering P (f) satisfies substitutability.
Theorem 10 Let P be substitutable. Then (Cw(P ), P (F )) and (Cw(P ), P (W )) are
non-empty complete lattices, and infP (F )Cw(P ) = supP (W )Cw(P ), and supP (F )Cw(P ) =
infP (W )Cw(P ).
Theorem 10 says that there are two distinguished core matchings, µW and µF
such that: For firms, µW = infP (F )Cw(P ) is worse, and µF = supP (F )Cw(P ) is
better, than any other core matchings. For workers µW = supP (W )Cw(P ) is better,
and µF = infP (W )Cw(P ) is worse, than any other core matching.
Proof of Theorem 10. First, (V ′, P (F )) is a complete lattice—due to space re-
strictions, we refer to the working paper version of the paper ([4]) for the proof. We
shall present the proof of the Theorem as 2 simple lemmata. We assume that P is
substitutable in the rest of the section.
Notation. Let V ′ = {ν ∈ V : ν(s)R(s)∅, for all s ∈ F ∪W}.
Remark. For all ν ∈ V , Tν ∈ V ′
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Lemma 11 Let µ and µ′ be pre–matchings. If µ′R (F )µ then, for all w ∈ W and
f ∈ F , U(f, µ) ⊆ U(f, µ′), and V (w, µ) ⊇ V (w, µ′).
Proof. Let w ∈ U(f, µ). We have that fR (w)µ(w), but µ(w)R (w)µ′(w) so w ∈
U(f, µ′). This proves U(f, µ) ⊆ U(f, µ′).
Now we shall prove that V (w, µ) ⊇ V (w, µ′). First, if V (w, µ′) = {∅}, then there
is nothing to prove, as {∅} = V (w, µ′) ⊆ V (w, µ). Suppose that V (w, µ′) 6= {∅} , and
let f ∈ V (w, µ′). Then, w ∈ Ch(µ′(f) ∪ {w}, P (f)).
But µ′R (F )µ, so the definition of R(F ) implies that, for all f ∈ F , either µ′(f) =
µ(f) so w ∈ Ch(µ(f) ∪ {w}, P (f)), or µ′(f) = Ch (µ′ (f) ∪ µ (f) , P (f)) . Then
w ∈ Ch(µ′(f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) implies that
w ∈ Ch (µ′(f) ∪ {w}, P (f))
= Ch (Ch (µ′ (f) ∪ µ (f) , P (f)) ∪ {w}, P (f))
(1)
=
Ch (µ′(f) ∪ µ(f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) .
Equality (1) is from [3, Proposition 2.3]. Substitutability of P implies that w ∈
Ch (µ(f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) . Then f ∈ V (w, µ) , and thus V (w, µ) ⊇ V (w, µ′).
Lemma 12 E is a nonempty and complete lattice.
Proof. First we show that T |V ′ is monotone increasing. That is, whenever µ′R (F )µ,
we have (Tµ′)R (F ) (Tµ).
Let µ′R (F )µ, and fix f ∈ F and w ∈ W . Lemma 11 says that U(f, µ) ⊆ U(f, µ′).
We first show that
Ch (U (f, µ′) , P (f)) = Ch ([Ch (U (f, µ′) , P (f)) ∪ Ch (U (f, µ) , P (f))] , P (f)) .
(13)
To see this, let S ⊆ Ch (U (f, µ′) , P (f)) ∪ Ch (U (f, µ) , P (f)). Then S ⊆ U(f, µ) ∪
U(f, µ′) = U(f, µ′), so Ch (U (f, µ′) , P (f))R(f)S. But, Ch (U (f, µ′) , P (f)) ⊆
Ch (U (f, µ′) , P (f)) ∪ Ch (U (f, µ) , P (f)), so we have established statement 13.
Now, (Tµ′)(f) = Ch (U (f, µ′) , P (f)) and (Tµ)(f) = Ch (U (f, µ) , P (f)), so
statement 13 implies that
(Tµ′)(f) = Ch([(Tµ′)(f) ∪ (Tµ)(f)] , P (f))). (14)
We now show that (Tµ)(w)R(w)(Tµ′)(w). Lemma 11 says that V (w, µ′) ⊆
V (w, µ). So,
(Tµ)(w) = max
P (f)
{V (w, µ)}R (w)max
P (f)
{V (w, µ′)} = (Tµ′)(w). (15)
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Statements 14 and 15 imply that (Tµ′)R(F )(Tµ), as f ∈ F and w ∈ W were
arbitrary.
Finally, T (V) ⊆ V ′ so E ⊆ V ′, and E equals the set of fixed points of T |V ′ .
T (V) ⊆ V ′ also implies that the restricted map T |V ′ has range in V ′.
Now we have that T |V ′ : V ′ → V ′ is monotone increasing, and V ′ is a complete lat-
tice. So Tarski’s fixed point theorem implies that (E , P (F )) is a non-empty complete
lattice.
Corollary 4 and Lemma 12 finish the proof of Theorem 10. See [4] for full details.
6 The T -algorithm and substitutability.
When preferences are substitutable, the T -algorithm
1. finds the worker-optimal core matching (infP (F )Cw(P )) and the firm-optimal
core matching (supP (F )Cw(P )),
2. is computationally efficient—we can give a bound on its computational com-
plexity and show that the bound is likely to be quite small,
3. calculates the lattice operations “join” and “meet,” on the Cw(P ) lattice.
Result 1 is important because it shows that the T -algorithm does the job of
the DAA. Further, by result 2 we have an idea of the T -algorithm’s computational
complexity, which is an open problem for the DAA in the many-to-one case. In a very
simple example, we show that, while the “size” of the problem is 30, 000 iterations,
the T -algorithm needs at most 9 iterations to find a core matching. Our result on
the complexity of the T -algorithm is similar to Topkis’s [14] (see also [15]) results on
algorithms for finding equilibria in supermodular games.
Result 3: A number of papers have sought to improve on Blair’s lattice operations
([8, 2]) by restricting firms’ preferences. We show that, with only substitutability,
the T -algorithm can compute the lattice operations—thus allowing for a practical
solution to the problem of Blair’s lattice operations.
6.1 The firm- and worker-optimal core matchings
Proposition 13 If P is substitutable, the T -algorithm starting at infP (F ) V ′ stops at
the worker-optimal core matching infP (F )Cw(P ); the T -algorithm starting at supP (F ) V ′
stops at the firm-optimal core matching supP (F )Cw(P ).
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Proof. When preferences are substitutable, T is a monotone map on the complete
lattice V ′. Proposition 13 follows then from standard results, see [14, 15].
Remarks.
1. The pre-matching infP (F ) V ′ is ν ∈ V with ν(f) = {∅} and ν(w) = maxP (w) F .
The pre-matching supP (F ) V ′ is ν with ν(f) = Ch(W,P (f)) and ν(w) = {∅}.
2. The T -algorithm starting at points that are not infP (F ) V ′ or supP (F ) V ′ may
not converge. For example, one can show that the T -algorithm starting at the
pre-matching ν =
((
supP (F ) V ′
)
F
,
(
infP (F ) V ′
)
W
)
cycles.
6.2 Complexity of the T -algorithm
We shall now give a bound on the computational complexity of the T -algorithm, but
we need some auxiliary definitions first.
For each f , let Xf = {A ⊆ W : AR(f)∅}, and let ≥f be the partial order on
Xf defined by A ≥ B iff A = Ch(A ∪ B,P (f)) or A = B. Let qf be the size of the
longest ≥f -chain in Xf . For each w, let Xw = {f ∈ F : fR(w)∅}, and let qw be the
number of elements in Xw. We present an example as “supplementary material” in
http://www.nyu.edu/jet/supplementary.html and in the working-paper version
([4]) of the paper.
Proposition 14 If P is substitutable, the T -algorithm starting at infP (F ) V ′ (supP (F ) V ′)
stops at the worker-optimal (firm-optimal) core matching in less than∑
s∈F∪W
(qs − 1)
iterations.
Proof. Let ν0, ν1, . . . νk be the sequence generated by the T -algorithm before it stops
at a core matching νk. The number of iterations before the algorithm stops at νk is
k, we shall prove that k ≤∑s∈F∪W (qs − 1).
Assume—without loss of generality—that we started the T -algorithm at ν0 =
infP (F ) V ′. Since ν1 = (Tν0)P (F )ν0 and T is monotone increasing (see the proof of
Theorem 10),
νkP (F )νk−1P (F ) . . . ν1P (F )ν0.
For each l, 1 ≤ l ≤ k, it must be that νl(f) = νl−1(f) or that νl(f) = Ch(νl(f) ∪
νl−1(f), P (f)) for all f , and νl−1(w)R(w)νl(w) for all w. Also, for each l, 1 ≤ l ≤ k,
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either νl(f) 6= νl−1(f) and νl(f) = Ch(νl(f) ∪ νl−1(f), P (f)) for some for f or
νl−1(w)P (w)νl(w) for some w—recall that P (F ) is a strict order, see Definition 4.
Say that l is an f -step if νl(f) 6= νl−1(f) and νl(f) = Ch(νl(f) ∪ νl−1(f), P (f)) for
firm f . Say that l is a w-step if νl−1(w)P (w)νl(w) for worker w. There cannot be
more than qs−1 s-steps, as a number of, say r steps involves a chain of r+1 elements
in Xs. Now k is smaller than the sum over all s ∈ W ∪ F of all s-steps, so
k ≤
∑
s∈F∪W
(qs − 1).
But k is the number of iterations of the T -algorithm before it finds νk.
Remark. Recall that |W | = m and |F | = n, so the number of pre-matchings is
2nm(n+ 1)m,
a number which is normally orders of magnitude larger than the bound in Proposi-
tion 14: In an example we develop as “supplementary material” in
http://www.nyu.edu/jet/supplementary.html (see also [4]) Proposition 14 implies
that the T -algorithm converges before∑
s∈F∪W
(qs − 1) = 9
iterations. Compare with the number of pre-matchings: 32768. The number of match-
ings is smaller than the number of pre-matchings, but still substantially larger than
9. It may be unfair to compare the complexity of the T -algorithm to the number of
pre-matchings, after all the T -algorithm will not involve pre-matchings where agents
are matched to unacceptable partners—but still, the number of pre-matchings that
only involve acceptable partners is 9261.
6.3 Computing the lattice operations
Let µ1, µ2 ∈ Cw (P ) . We shall look at the problem of finding µ1 ∨P (F ) µ2, the join
(least upper bound) of µ1 and µ2 in the (Cw (P ) , P (F ))-lattice. One can solve the
problem of finding µ1 ∧P (F ) µ2 in the (Cw (P ) , P (F ))-lattice in a similar way.
Mart´ınez, Masso´, Neme and Oviedo ([8, 9]) prove that, when preferences satisfy
substitutability and an additional assumption (which they call q-separability) there
is a simple formula for µ1 ∨P (F ) µ2 (see [2] for a similar result). Mart´ınez, Masso´,
Neme and Oviedo prove that µ1 ∨P (F ) µ2 is
ν(s) =
{
Ch (µ1 (s) ∪ µ2 (s) , P (s)) if s ∈ F
min
P (s)
{µ1 (s) , µ2 (s)} if s ∈ W. (16)
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In general, though, when preferences are only substitutable, there is no formula for
µ1∨P (F )µ2. In fact, ν defined in (16) is a pre-matching but not necessarily a matching.
We prove that, if one starts the T -algorithm at ν, it will stop at µ1 ∨P (F ) µ2. Hence
we give a practical solution to Blair’s problem of calculating µ1 ∨P (F ) µ2. 3
Theorem 15 Let P be substitutable, let µ1 and µ2 be core matchings, and ν be defined
as in (16). The T -algorithm started at ν stops at µ1 ∨P (F ) µ2.
Proof. Let Vˆ = {ν ∈ V : νR (F ) ν} . First we prove (1) that T Vˆ ⊆ Vˆ . Then we
prove (2) that T -algorithm starting at ν stops at µ1 ∨P (F ) µ2.
(1) First we shall prove that ν is the least upper bound on {µ1, µ2} in V . By the
definition of ν, νR(F )µ1 and νR(F )µ2.
Let ν be an upper bound on {µ1, µ2} in V , we shall prove that νR(F )ν. For any
f ∈ F :
ν (f)R (f)µ1 (f) ⇐⇒ ν (f) (1)= Ch (ν (f) ∪ µ1 (f) , P (f))
ν (f)R (f)µ2 (f) ⇐⇒ ν (f) (2)= Ch (ν (f) ∪ µ2 (f) , P (f)) .
We have that
Ch (ν (f) ∪ ν (f) , P (f)) (3)= Ch (ν (f) ∪ Ch (µ1 (f) ∪ µ2 (f) , P (f)) , P (f))
(4)
= Ch (ν (f) ∪ µ1 (f) ∪ µ2 (f) , P (f))
(5)
= Ch (Ch (ν (f) ∪ µ1 (f) , P (f)) ∪ µ2 (f) , P (f))
(6)
= Ch (ν (f) ∪ µ2 (f) , P (f))
(7)
= ν (f) .
Where equality (3) follows from the definition of ν. Equalities (4) and (5) follow
from substitutability and [3, Proposition 2.3]. Equality (6) follows from equality
(1). Equality (7) follows from equality (2) . Thus, νFR (F ) νF . Now, νR (F )µ
1 and
νR (F )µ2 imply that, for any w ∈ W, µ1 (w)R (w) ν (w), and µ2 (w)R (w) ν (w) . But
then,
ν (w) = min
P (w)
{
µ1 (w) , µ2 (w)
}
R (w) ν (w) .
This and νFR (F ) νF implies that νR (F ) ν. Hence ν is the least upper bound on
{µ1, µ2} in V .
Now we shall prove that T Vˆ ⊆ Vˆ . Let ν ∈ Vˆ , then νR(F )νR(F )µ1 and νR(F )νR(F )µ2.
But then TνR(F )Tµ1 and TνR(F )Tµ2, as T is monotone. Now, µ1 and µ2 are core
3Blair’s proof of the existence of µ1∨P (F )µ2 can also be expressed as an algorithm for calculating
µ1 ∨P (F ) µ2.
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matchings, so µ1 = Tµ1 and µ2 = Tµ2; then Tν is an upper bound on {µ1, µ2} in V .
But ν is the least upper bound, so TνR(F )ν and thus Tν ∈ Vˆ .
(2) We know that T Vˆ ⊆ Vˆ , so T |Vˆ : Vˆ → Vˆ . T is monotone and ν is the smallest
pre-matching in Vˆ . By Topkis’s [14] results, the T -algorithm stops at the R(F )-
smallest fixed point of T |Vˆ ; but this is the R(F )-smallest fixed point of T , of those
fixed points that are R(F )-larger than both µ1 and µ2. Then the T -algorithm stops
at µ1 ∨P (F ) µ2.
Remarks.
1. A key part of the proof of Theorem 15 is that ν is the join of µ1 and µ2 in V .
By a similar argument, the T -algorithm calculates the meet, µ1∧P (F ) µ2, of any
two core matchings µ1 and µ2. One only needs to start the algorithm at the
meet of µ1 and µ2 in V instead of the join. 4
2. The bound presented in Proposition 14 also bounds the number of T -iterations
necessary to calculate µ1 ∨P (F ) µ2.
We now illustrate how the algorithm finds the join of two core matchings:
Example 16 ([10]). Let F = {f1, f2, f3, f4, f5} be the set of firms and
W = {w1, w2, w3, w4, w5, w6} be the set of workers. As in [10], we specify only prefer-
ences among the choices we shall need. P (f1) = {w4} , {w1} , {w2, w3, w5, w6} , ..., {w5},
P (f2) = {w2} , {w1, w3}, P (f3) = {w3} , {w2}, P (f4) = {w5} , {w4, w6}, P (f5) =
{w6} , {w5}, P (w1) = f2, f1, P (w2) = f1, f3, f2, P (w3) = f1, f2, f3, P (w4) = f4, f1,
P (w5) = f1, f5, f4, P (w6) = f1, f4, f5, Consider the following two core matchings
f1 f2 f3 f4 f5
µ1 = {w1} {w2} {w3} {w4, w6} {w5}
and
f1 f2 f3 f4 f5
µ2 = {w4} {w1, w3} {w2} {w5} {w6}
.
f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 w1 w2 w3 w4 w5 w6
ν1 = w4 w2 w3 w5 w6 f1 f2 f3 f1 f4 f5
U(f, ν1)/V (w, ν1) = w1, w4 w2 w3 w5 w6 ∅ f2 f3 f1 f4 f5
ν2 = w4 w2 w3 w5 w6 ∅ f2 f3 f1 f4 f5.
ν2 is a matching and ν2 = µ1 ∨P (F ) µ2.
4See [2] on how to calculate the meet of µ1 and µ2 in V.
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List of Symbols
Symbol Explanation LATEXcode
µ Greek letter “mu.” \mu
ν Greek letter “nu.” \nu
V Calligraphic letter “V.” \mathcal{V}
M Calligraphic letter “M.” \mathcal{M}
E Calligraphic letter “E.” \mathcal{E}
Ch Letters “C” and “h.” $Ch$
∈ Belongs to set. \in
⊆ Contained in set. \subseteq
∪ Union of sets \cup
∩ Union of sets \cap
∨ Lattice operation “join.” \vee
∧ Lattice operation “meet.” \wedge
